Hence, the origins of the unity of thephysical forces in the universe might be of informational
nature,i.e. without reducing the forces to information, they are determinedby the deep information.
There exists a deep matter. Thisstatement, which is duly justified in this
ontology, is now morecertain in the author's view than it was at the time when thetext was being
written. Today, both science and philosophy cansupport such a statement.
How the deep matter is like hasthus far been no concern of science, which
philosophy can no longeravoid. What appears to be positive as soon as we recognize theexistence of
the deep matter is that we can expect it to haveproperties less ordinary with respect to what we
know about thematter in the universe, but which should account for the propertiesof the matter in
By virtue of this philosophy, beneath thequantum world there lies the deep matter which consists of
twoprinciples: the informatter, i.e. a matter endowed with informationalproperties of
phenomenological type (like the mental senses);the energymatter, i.e. a non-organized matter
endowed with energyproperties which can be organized by the informatter. The imagegiven by author
for these constituents of the deep matter andtheir properties is not fairly accurate, now that it
is pre-matureto make final statements. There might be only one deep matterendowed with two
principles - one informational and the otherenergetical - which may or may not interact, as the
case may be.There might be indeed two constituents which might or might notcombine, as the case
may be. The existence of two principles ishowever decisive. In defect of this, any dialectics of
the matterwould be difficult to conceive. Energy alone could not explainthe world, though some
philosophers attempted to explain it onenergy bases. On the other side, information alone would not
explainthe world. The informatter shows that the question is about atype of deep information in
the matter; the energymatter showsthat the question is about a form of deep energy in the matter.
On the Author's Ontologyiii