Chapter 1
The Limit of the Thing-in-Itself

1. Immanuel Kant1 avoided the issue of existence, which he treated as the "thing-in-itself", yet it turned out to be decisive in his approach. Kant soughtto refine reason as an instrument of cognition, to lay firm foundationsfor it, but he did so only after his view on the issue of existencehad become clear. And this view is bound up with the way he conceivedreason as an instrument of cognition.
His undertaking is nevertheless ontological,inasmuch as he chose from the very beginning to refute the objectiveexistence of space and time from the various possible solutionsto the paradoxes raised by existence.
We shall try to relieve this paradox by assumingan "additional coordinate" to those of space and time.This solution will be further referred to that adopted by Kant.The syntagmas "additional coordinate" denotes an imageof a classical mechanical type and is used to embrace the depths of the material world. However, we shall not finally confine thisstudy to this reference frame.
Both the rejection of space and time as objectiverealities and the adoption of an additional coordinate, or ofidealist solutions like the existence of a complementary realmof ideas, of the universal spirit or of will show that the hostsof philosophical solutions to the issue of existence get far fromthe immediate common sense. However, as soon as science gainsa safer ground in this realm, the new cognitive models will largelyuse human thought and these models will frame against a more accessiblerationality irrespective of their degree of abstraction.

Given the apparently paradoxical side of theissue of existence, many scientists are no longer tempted to approachit.
It is however strange to notice that reasonapplied to existence enforces a necessary release out of existence,or the recognition of something beyond the known existence andthe need to supplement this by an orthoexistence, in a more comprehensiveexistence which will be referred to as "material world". Alternatively, it may derive in supplementing this world withidea, spirit, will. Of course, solutions so different in meaningand philosophical signification depend on the scientific experiencein stock. Thinking in itself is however the principal factor.
Kant eschewed any attempt at supplementingexistence, which is peremptory once we accept space and time tobe objective phenomena in our universe. Nor has today's sciencemanaged to establish a physical model for the deep worldsupplementing our universe.

The easiest way to imagine something beyondspace and time is to think of an "additional" coordinatefor the material world, as a model in the language familiar tous. This idea stands as a physical necessity to our mind. Of course,the idea of a coordinate should not be taken ad literam, for it is a first approximation model of a deep material realitywhich we have now to decode.
The idea of an additional coordinate has beensuggested in approaching existence by philosophers and scientistsbut has been currently rejected. Descartes was the first to raisethis issue but he subsequently rejected a possible Vth coordinate,in addition to space and time, on grounds of being absurd.
As Kant was both a philosopher and a scientist,it is no wonder that the issue of existence did not appear absurdto him, and was to be approached by all means. What was absurdto him were the conclusions reached by accepting space and time as being within existence, within the things-in-themselves. Letus also note that absurd contrary given by Berkely's solutionreducing everything to the subject and rejecting any externalobjective reality. If the things-in-themselves contain space andtime, Kant observes, "and reflect on the absurdities in whichwe find ourselves involved ... we cannot blame for good Berkeleyfor degrading bodies to mere illusory appearances"2.
Against a whole world of absurdities, Kantnotes that "If we do not thus make them (i.e. space and time)objective forms of all things, there is no way left then to makethem subjective forms of our mode of intuition-external and internal"3. This quotation might explain why Kant soughtto get out of the deadlock by a chosen solution, whichturned out to be ultimately refuted by the entire scientific practice,though Kant's role in pushing science forward was extraordinary.
Indeed, it seems that we can either assumean orthoexistence or reject the objective reality of space andtime so that the world in its entire existence should appear lessparadoxical. Is there any other rational solution left ? WithKant, all that surrounds us immediately are actually things-in-themselves, which cannot be cognized in full depth. They can only be cognizedunder their phenomenal aspect which is more dependent on ourselvesrather than on the thing-in-itself.

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