Chapter 5
Towards a Science of Law Formation Zone


The title of this chapter might suggest theauthor's intention to hypostatize laws, but this is not the case.Once science could sound into the law formation zone1, we could have further insight into the material world and this would cast new light on the whole history of science. Before having such a glimpse, the whole science from Copernicus, Descartes, Galileo, Kepler and Newton to Faraday and Maxwell, Einstein and Plank, Louis de Broglie, Schrodinger and Heisenberg, looks like a block, like a science aimed to account for the given universe. This frame-objective has been the same for both classical and quantum physics which have gone as far as the borders of the law formation zone. Let us note in this respect that the Romanian philosopher Lucian Blaga has also regarded the whole of the modern science as a block as "... the emphasis falls ... on the discovery of laws"2. By virtue of an approach methodologically grounded in mathematics-experiment, science possesses a theorizing level, referred to by Blaga as the law level. Adopting this view on a whole period of scientific development, in what follows we shall resort to the entire historical scheme furnished by Lucian Blaga in support of several considerations concerning the science of the law formation zone.

Blaga's scheme reads as follows:

1. During the prehistorical age, when science was not yet at work, human thought was prevailingly mythical and magic, remnants of this way of thinking being increasingly weaker in the course of history;

2. The beginnings of science relate to theobservation and rational understanding of immediate phenomena."In order to make observations, man has only to awaken hissenses and to move in his environment in pursuit of his aims"3. This is empeiria, which is intimately connected to human practice. Science begins however as soon as the empirical reality gets rationalized. "Science could not develop without rationalizing activities ... one of the rationalizing modes consists in organizing the empirical knowledge into forms of logical thought"4. This was done already by the Ancient Greeks, though the concepts they employed were not that different from the common sense, from the ordinary empeiria. What really matters is that with the Ancient science "the logical structures ... of the human thought develop to the detriment of the mythical and magic structures. This means ... a functional emphasis on the logical thought, which succeeds in bringing myth and magic out of practice"5. Notwithstanding the experimental, dialectical elements and the atomic conceptions vehiculated by the Ancient Greek thought, the prevailing view of the world was statical. According to Blaga, the Greeks attempted to rationalize the empeiria by virtue of identity (the logical principle of identity), which "is conducive to an immobilization of existence"6. The principle of identity leads to tautological judgements, "to the negation of empeiria, to sterility"7, to a rationality divorcing itself from empeiria and from other sources of knowledge. Let us note here Blaga's idea to ensure an openness to the principle of identity so as to have a more effective rationalization. Thus, he refers to "rationalization along weakened identity ... rationalization guided by the identity postulate to a certain point"8. Blaga made the subtle remark that "The identity postulate is of course present in the human mind, but it is a historical fact that the human thought does not let itself become maneuvered by this postulate".

Experiment as a research method was first practised by the Arabs. During the Middle Ages, it became ordinary in Europe, where Petrus Peregrinus de Maricourt of Picardia (1269) and Roger Bacon (1214 - 1294) theorized on its use. Roger Bacon introduced the concept of scientia experimentalis. Motion, dynamics were beginning to gain in importance. Nicola Oresme (1323 - 1382) claimed the mathematical determination of motion. Lucian Blaga viewed the Gothic style as a representation of motion9.
With the Greeks, rationalization came to beexpressed by both logical and mathematical means. Morris Kline10 observes that already some 600 years B.C., the Greeks became aware of some order in nature, working invariably according to a scheme, and came gradually to believe that the human mind can grasp this order as it is endowed with supreme powers.

To Plato, the world had been geometrically designed, and this explains his attempt to substitute nature for mathematics. The Greeks "saw in mathematics the ultimate truth about the structure and the project of universe"11, and "Aristotle's writings are fully convincing that he derived logic from mathematics"12. Unlike Aristotle, Plato describes an objective, universally valid world, consisting of forms and ideas. In modern terms, what is the informational seed of a like conception ? Does this not show that although the Greeks, first the Ancient geometers and then Aristotle, were the first virtuosi of deductive proofs, seeking the truth by means of rigorous proofs, while attempting to sound deeper by intuitive means into an ultimate realm which they assumed to be pertinent to laws or to the everlasting support of laws !? This ultimate realm is with Plato a statical world, a world of motionless forms and ideas, whereas motion can only arise in the world of sensibles which is assumedly semi-real, derived from the world of idea. This tentative approach to an ultimate realm of world profundities is an idealist counterpart of an objective requirement which contemporary science is beginning to validate.

Towards a Science of Law Formation Zone 37