Between action and beingness we should place the reason, that keeps the balance between the two. Here we deal with a weighted balance since the proportions of the two in man's life are not necessary equal. It is reason that can strike a balance between the intellect, both deterministic and probabilistic, and the vague and primitive language (but nevertheless overall and enfolding), such that a new connection, a new aspect is revealed. Of course, one can also develop a new connection using stochastic means, but nobody knows if perhaps the stochastic is not of a deeper root.
If the man is between beingness and socialness, then he is a interference of the two. Beingness spreads into the man through self-consciousness and individual knowledge, although, due to socialness, these are raised at a new level, at that of consciousness and knowledge with social character.
But we can ask about returning to beingness by coming from socialness towards man (a man enriched with consciousness and social knowledge); and then returning through a self-consciousness enveloping the socialness and knowledge towards an essential-awareness. This would be a summit moment of man's spiritual life; it would still be considered meditative, though enriched with knowledge.
Perhaps it is possible to overcome the essential-awareness up to the return into a beingness with knowledge, permitting a new type of human action over a new type of material existence. It might be possible for the essential-beingness not to remain only meditative (although it could also remain as such), but the individualized and socialized self-consciousnesses to trigger a will and a purpose of reason, as resulting from the complete extension of beingness-individual-socialness into the world.

If rationality is essential for science (as the whole history of science has proved) than the philosophical experiment, going up to the limits of to-day's rational thinking still remains anchored in a rationality that it tries to push as far as possible. (Nevertheless, it is trying continuously to penetrate beyond these limits, either for contacting the beingness phenomena, or for interpreting, on a rational scale, certain conditions of the nervous system via new elements and ideas, or for imagining things.) The philosophical experiment is placed at a limit that records a historic displacement, in connection with the progress of scientific knowledge as applied to human society.
Science is not a mere reflection of the material world, it is construction corresponding to the possibilities of our central nervous system, an active construction based on the principle of compatibility or identity between the nervous system and the rest of the world. The brain, our central nervous system, is in the last instance a material device surrounded by the rest of the matter. A rather surprising fact is that the brain can perform experiments not only on what it is outside it, but also on itself.

The beingness experiment appeared to us rather like a physical phenomenon once we managed to detach it from any consciousness fact and from a certain afective state, i.e. from any of the usual psychic processes. Hence, if anything exists "beyond" our central nervous system, and coupled with it, then that is a physical entity, possibly an information carrier, but not a conscious one. Consciousness supposes a specific material organization; we find consciousness here, in our existence, but this does not exclude the possibility of it radiating "somewhere" through beingness. We have seen that to the beingness experiment one can associate immediately a psychic state, a state-symbol, that can be memorized, can be recalled to the mind without actually living the beingness. Experimenting beingness simultaneously with the consciousness of its symbol (with a new state resulting from the confrontation of the first two, a state by which we realize what is taking place) we sense the difference between the phenomenon and its psychic symbol i.e. knowing, realizing in a natural, instinctive way a mental, rational construction. It records the objective, direct, intimate relationship between the physical reality and the modus operandi of our nervous system. Maybe the psychic symbol of beingness is after all a reflection, but its confrontation with reality leading to the state "to know" is no longer a reflection, but an active construction of our mind.

The constructive character of o knowledge in relation with the external human world is now recognized as such in psychology up to the study of perception phenomena8. Very interesting experiments regarding the visual perception have shown that perception, for example of a group of figures, does not represent in a sure way the reality around us, but according to W. H. Itelson and F. P. Kilpatrik, perception is our personal construction meant to obtain the best possible interpretation to lead our action9.

Such a statement is based on past experience since the subject seems to connect to the configuration that stimulates it, a complex that integrates probabilistically various previous experiences having similar configurations10.

For this reason, if an external view creates on the retina a configuration identical with a known image then it will be interpreted as the known one; only after a more detailed analysis the perception will change, even if the image on the retina remains the same. Thus perception appears as a function of action, experience and probability. For the two authors, as mentioned before, the perceived thing forms an inseparable part of the perception function, i.e. the perceived thing is not a subjective creation of the mind, nor a revelation of some reality postulated to exist apart from the perceiving organism. The object and the perception are parts and fragments of the same thing11.
The philosophical importance of this point of view, experimentally sustained, comes from the conclusion that an objective compatibility correspondence exists between what it is "outside" and what it is "in the mind". Hence the objective character of human knowledge. Although direct perception is never sure, nevertheless we construct models to interpret the world as correct as possible; this is our way of interacting with the surroundings.

Certain general models are known for the decision taking activity of the human machine (the central nervous system)12. Sometimes this decision taking process is considered a result of man's will. But it seems that the decision of an action, a movement, a behavior, is taken in the reticular formation of the spine (see the cybernetic model of W. L. Kilmer and W. S. McCullogh13). This model has at least the merit of ordering a series of concepts regarding the decisions taken by the nervous system. According to this model, the reticular formation is treated as being a series of modules (Fig.1) that receive sensorial stimuli (usually different, but partly common) from various modules. The response (decision) can undergo a certain number of ways of action. If over half of the modules attach over 50% to a certain mode of response, than the decision is take in favour of this mode. The sensorial excitation is different for each module, while the reticular formation works in close correlation with the brain. The brain probably offers multiple ways of solution, while the reticular formation is to make the choice. The brain also offers the motivational and affective elements that play an important role in decision taking. C. Balaceanu and E. Nicolau distinguish a biological motivation and ahigher psychological motivation14. The decision process taking place in the reticular formation has a biological character, i.e. non-psychological, and could also be taken automatically. The decision can not be connected with a will only, as also observed in psychology. "Indeed, since the behavior must be permanently dynamical, the principal factor conditioning its development and its efficiency is the decision. But this does not depend only on the state of the cognitive (and volitional) components of the system, but also on the general traits of the personality, on its orientation, on the assembled attitudes and significances with which the subject meets the world. Hence, when one analyzes and explains the dynamics of behavior, one should also take into consideration the affective and emotional factors"15.


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